

PHILOSOPHY OF MIND

PHIL 4310/6310
Dr. Robert G. Burton

Spring Semester 2005
3:30P-4:45P TR Peabody 205S

Course Description: What are minds, and how are they known? How well do we know our own minds? Can we ever know the minds of others as well as we know our own? What is the relation between our minds and our bodies? What is consciousness? What is consciousness for? Is mental causation (top down control) possible, and if so, how? Can we account for the existence of phenomenal experience, and if so, how? What can neuroscience and computational modeling teach us about consciousness? In this course we shall address these questions from a variety of differing perspectives. Our anthologies contain a rich collection of important, contemporary sources by leading philosophers engaged in serious dialogue with one another.

Requirements: The course requirements include class participation, two conventional essay exams, and a final exam paper instead of a conventional final examination due no later than 6:30 p.m. on May 5, 2005. Make-up exams will be scheduled on a case by case basis. Students are required to attend class and to have read the day's assignment in advance. Class participation, the quantity and quality of your comments and questions in class, will count 10%, the two exams will each count 25%, and the final exam paper will count 40% of the grade for the course. The schedule of reading assignments and exams is given below. Any student whose total number of absences exceeds four, after the conclusion of drop/add, *may* be administratively withdrawn without notice. The University's policy on academic honesty is in effect and will be enforced. This syllabus provides a general plan for the course; deviations may be necessary.

Final Essay Topic: The essay topic of the final exam paper is being given to you now to insure that your critical and reflective effort this semester is well focused. It is designed to elicit your well reasoned choices among the alternatives that we study and in so doing to help you discover and develop your own philosophical position. The paper should be from 7 to 10 double spaced pages in length for undergraduates and from 10 to 15 double spaced pages in length for graduate students and it should be submitted no later than 6:30 p.m. on May 5, 2005. Essay topic: In your considered judgment, what is the most credible position on the nature and function of consciousness that we have studied or that you can formulate? What are its strengths and weaknesses? How would you answer standard objections to your chosen theory? Is mental causation possible from the perspective of your chosen theory, and if so, how? All things considered, why is your chosen theory the best?

Texts: *Natural and Artificial Minds*, ed. R. G. Burton (Albany, NY: The SUNY Press, 1993).

The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates, ed. N. Block, O. Flanagan, & G. Güzeldere (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1997).

Office Hours: Dr. Burton's office hours are by appointment in Peabody 107 (Phone: 542-2814, e-mail: rburton@uga.edu). You are also welcome to drop by his office for brief matters at any time.

PHILOSOPHY OF MIND

Schedule of Assignments

Date	Assignments	Pages in Texts
1/11	General Introduction	
1/13	Burton's Approaches to Mind	NAM 1-20
1/18	Güzeldere's Field Guide	NC 1-21
1/20	Güzeldere's Field Guide	NC 21-67
1/25	Neisser	NAM 147-164
1/27	William James	NC 71-82
2/1	Dennett & Flanagan	NC 83-93
2/3	Flanagan	NC 97-109
2/8	Burton	NAM 231-243
2/10	Goldman	NC 111-125
2/15	Bechtel & Abrahamsen	NAM 69-100
2/17	Patricia Churchland	NC 127-140
2/22	Paul Churchland	NAM 21-67
2/24	Brian C. Smith	NAM 187-229
3/1	First Exam	
3/3	Baars	NC 187-201
3/8	Farah	NC 203-236
3/10	Crick & Koch	NC 277-292
3/14-18	Spring Break	
3/22	Flanagan	NC 357-373
3/24	Work on Final Exam Paper	
3/29	Van Gulick	NC 435-442
3/31	Nagel	NC 519-527
4/5	Van Gulick	NC 559-566
4/7	Jackson & Paul Churchland	NC 567-577
4/12	Armstrong	NC 721-728
4/14	Lycan	NC 755-771
4/19	Dretske	NC 773-788
4/21	Güzeldere	NC 789-806
4/26	Second Exam	
4/28	Our Last Day of Class - Discuss Final Exam Paper	
5/5	Final Exam Paper Due - 6:30 p.m.	

Robert Burton “Approaches to Mind”

1. What six approaches to the study of mind are introduced, and how are they distinguished from one another?
2. What is the organizing thesis of this anthology?
3. How did experimental psychology begin according to Boring? What does it mean to localize the mind in the brain?
4. What is privileged access, and how does the possibility of psychology involve coming to terms with it?
5. What is the relation between reduction and elimination?
How does one distinguish between candidates for one or the other?
6. What is the difference between type and token forms of the identity theory?
7. What is the argument from multiple realizability, and how does it challenge type functionalism no less than type identity theory?
8. How does the older "rules and representations" form of AI differ from connectionism, and what are their respective strengths and weaknesses?
9. How do experimental forms of behaviorism differ from philosophical forms, and what are their respective strengths and weaknesses?
10. What is intentionality and why is it important?
11. Why did Russell propose that we represent intentional states as "propositional attitudes," and what is problematic about them?
12. What is "folk psychology," and what will be its fate?

Güven Güzeldere's The Many Faces of Consciousness: A Field Guide

1. Conceptual Foundations: The many uses of the term “*consciousness*”
2. The Mystery of Consciousness and the Explanatory Gap
3. Two questions: a. Is the mystery a consequence of a materialist ontology?
b. Is the mystery a consequence of our limited cognitive (epist.) capacities?
4. Skepticism about consciousness: Will the concept of consciousness go the way of the concepts of caloric, phlogiston, and demonic possession?
5. The Consciousness Naturalists: Full-Blown Naturalists vs Ns.-at-Heart
6. A Multitude of Difficulties: Social vs Psychological aspects of the term
7. Psychological C: “Consciousness of” (transitive) vs intransitive usage of C.,
Creature Consciousness vs State Consciousness
8. The Two Faces of Consciousness: Causal vs Phenomenal, What C does vs
How C seems. The *Segregationist Intuition* vs the *Integrationist Intuition*
9. Consciousness in early modern philosophy
10. Consciousness in the last hundred years: William James' Puzzle
11. From Introspectionism to Behaviorism to Cognitivism (and Beyond)
12. The Unconscious: Freudian Unconscious vs the Cognitive Unconscious
13. From Information Processing to Qualia: Neisser's The subjective,
experiential aspect of consciousness as “an aspect of activity rather than as an
independently definable mechanism” (a mere epiphenomenon)
14. Can Consciousness and intentionality be understood or explained

independently of each other? (the *segregationist intuition*) Figure 1.1 p.23.

15. Epistemic Perspectivity: Asymmetry between 1st and 3rd person access
16. 1st person, Consciousness as it seems vs 3rd person, Con. as it does
17. Only in the *segregationist intuition* are the phenomenal and the causal antipodal and mutually exclusive.
18. Block's Access Consciousness vs Phenomenal Consciousness
19. Chalmers' "Easy Problems of Consciousness" vs the "Hard Problem"
20. 5 Qs: 1. What are the media and mechanisms of C?, 2. Where is the locus of C?, 3. Who is a conscious being?, 4. Why is there C?, 5. How does C arise?
21. What is the binding phenomenon, and what is the Crick & Koch explanatory hypothesis concerning its underlying neural correlates?
22. What is the modularity of mental function thesis?
23. What do Dennett and Kinsbourne mean by the "Cartesian Theater?"
24. What are "philosophical zombies" ? Do they lead to epiphenomenalism?
25. Güzeldere's Roadmap for Phenomenal Consciousness - "Whatitsliketobe"
26. The Qualia Battles: absent qualia and the inverted spectrum
27. Jackson's Knowledge Argument
28. The stalemate and how to settle it: Rethink the epistemology and conceptual schemes under the *integrationist intuition*.

Ulric Neisser "Without Perception, No Knowledge: Implications for AI"

1. What is Neisser's central thesis, and how does it suggest a critique of traditional computational approaches to cognitive science?
2. What is the grounding problem in artificial intelligence?
3. What is Neisser's critique of the "Turing test?"
4. What, according to Neisser, does it mean to know something?
Why are meanings not just verbal? What is the link between perceptual and propositional knowledge?
5. What are affordances?
6. What is the distinction between orientation and recognition, and what use does Neisser make of it?
7. What is the ecological approach to visual perception?
8. What are Gibson's three distinct levels of analysis, and what does each involve?
9. How do Gibson's and Neisser's ecological claims differ from phenomenological descriptions?
10. What two central claims does Neisser's ecological account of perceptual knowledge make?
11. What additional claim does Neisser make about the idea of truth itself?
12. What are Neisser's concluding thoughts concerning AI?

William James on the Stream of Consciousness

1. The synthetic method vs the analytic method
2. Consciousness of some sort goes on.
 1. Every “state” is part of a personal consciousness.
 2. Conscious states are always changing.
 3. Consciousness is sensibly continuous.
 4. Consciousness is selective in its attention.
3. Substantive resting places & Transitive places of flight
4. Sensationalists and Intellectualists are both wrong.
5. Relations are as real as objects.
6. Objects have fringes, and fringes are important.

Dennett on “The Cartesian Theater” and “Filling In”

- A. Cartesian Materialism
- B. The Multiple Drafts Model
- C. The Binding Problem
- D. Filling In

Flanagan answers Dennett on 1. Continuity, 2. the Binding Problem, and 3. the Massively Parallel vs the Serial Mind.

Flanagan's Unified T of C or What Dreams are Made Of.

- A. No Hodgepodes Allowed
 - 1. Consciousness Exists
 - 2. C has Depth, Hidden Structure, Functions, & History
 - 3. Conscious states, processes, events are heterogeneous
- B. How to Naturalize Consciousness
- C. How Dreams are like Being Awake
- D. The Superficiality Objection
- E. Two Ways to Build a Theory of Consciousness
- F. The Best Strategy

Robert G. Burton "Reduction, Elimination, and Strategic Interdependence"

1. What is Burton's central thesis, and what four different research strategies exemplify it? Give examples of each.
2. Can you think of other examples besides the ones discussed in this essay?
3. What is your assessment of Burton's thesis?
4. What is Burton's critique of classical reduction theory.
5. What is Wimsatt's alternative theory of emergence and reduction?
6. What is your assessment of Wimsatt's theory?

Goldman's "Consciousness, Folk Psy. & Cognitive Science"

A. Defining Consciousness

1. Operational
2. Functional
3. Self-Knowledge/Monitoring or Higher-Order Ref.
4. Intrinsicism: Phenomenal Consciousness

B. Challenges to Folk-Psy. Concept of Consciousness

1. Eliminativism
2. Consciousness is not a natural kind
3. Allport's search for behavioral criteria
4. Flanagan's and Schacter's responses
5. Dennett and Kinsbourne

C. Intrinsic Qualities and Self-Attribution

1. Privileged Access and the Functionalist Challenge
2. Neural Properties
3. Phenomenal Properties - Qualia

William Bechtel and A. A. Abrahamsen "Connectionism and the Future of Folk Psychology"

1. How do B & A contrast reduction with eliminativism?
In what sense might reduction eliminate?
2. What do B & A say about 1960s proposals to eliminate folk psychology?
What two modifications characterize eliminativism today?
3. How do B & A propose to argue that the eliminativists' attack on folk psychology is misguided?
4. What two forms of folk psychology are distinguished by B & A, and why is this important?
5. What are three levels of commitment in the "philosophical" version of folk psychology?
6. How does Jerry Fodor's language-of-thought make use of this conceptual apparatus? Can you contrast reductionist with eliminativist strategies used by the critics of the language-of-thought defense of folk psychology?
7. How does Fodor argue for the autonomy of higher level sciences? How would you assess Fodor's defense of propositional attitude psychology?
8. What is the connectionist challenge? How do eliminativists make use of connectionism? How do Fodor and Pylyshyn challenge the connectionists, and what resources are available to the connectionists who would answer Fodor and Pylyshyn?
9. How do B & A argue that folk psychology is not committed to causally productive internal states, propositional modularity, or propositional attitudes? Are their arguments convincing?
10. What essential role will folk psychology continue to play even if connectionism becomes well established according to B & A? Do you agree?
11. How can folk idioms have a causal function and yet not refer to specific

internal processes?

12. Why do folk idioms have the sort of looseness identified in rejecting propositional modularity?

13. How did the propositional attitude story arise according to B & A? Does their account sound plausible to you?

Patricia Churchland's Neurobiology and Consciousness

A. Reductionist Strategy

1. Not purely Bottom-Up
2. An Acceptable sense of "Emergence"

B. Answering Objections to the Neurobiological Goal

1. The Goal is Absurd or Incoherent
2. The Goal is inconsistent with Multiple Realizability
3. Searle's *The Brain Causes Consciousness*
4. Argument from Ignorance - Our Feeble Intelligence

C. Tracking Down the Neural Mechanisms of Consciousness

1. What to Study - Finding a Route In - Visual C
2. The Crick Hypothesis
3. The Llinás Hypothesis

D. Concluding Remarks

Paul Churchland "On the Nature of Theories: A Neurocomputational Perspective"

1. What is Churchland's sketch and critique of the classical view of theories?

2. What alternative approaches does he consider and what are their respective shortcomings?
3. What is Churchland's neurofunctional framework, and how would you assess its promise?
4. How, according to Churchland, might AI Models of elementary brainlike networks achieve representation and learning?
5. What are some functional properties of brainlike networks?
6. How faithfully do these networks depict the brain?
7. What is the naturalization of epistemology, and how does computational neuroscience contribute to it?
8. How does Churchland's analysis speak to the issue of the theory-ladenness of observation? ...to Kuhn's notion of a paradigm? ...to the issue of explanatory unity? ...to the hope for a convergent realism?
9. What do you make of Churchland's optimistic concluding remarks?
10. What does Churchland say in response to the claim that normative epistemology cannot be "naturalized?" To what extent do you agree or disagree?

Brian Cantwell Smith "The Owl and the Electric Encyclopedia"

1. What radical claim of Lenat and Feigenbaum is the target of Smith's critical review? What is the significance of the suggestion (note 2, p. 219) that the real task of the "CYC" project is to write down the complement of the

encyclopedia: everything we know but have never needed to say?

2. What is "conceptual tunneling," and what serious forms of it are L & F engaging in according to Smith?
3. What is "embedded computation," and how does Smith provide a profile of it with a dozen foundational questions from three different perspectives? (p. 194 ff. Consider each question in turn.)
4. What are Smith's concluding thoughts concerning the possibility of AI as a universal view "from nowhere?"

Essay Topics for the First Exam

1. Write an essay on the problem of privileged access. How and how successfully did behaviorists and type identity theorists deal with the problem? Why have consciousness studies become fashionable only

relatively recently? Be specific and defend your claims.

2. Write an essay on the relation between reduction and elimination in the attack on “folk psychology.” Is folk psychology here to stay? If so, why; if not, why not? Be specific and defend your claims.

3. Write an essay on Owen Flanagan’s “natural method” for studying consciousness. What is an example of its application? What are its strengths and weaknesses?

4. Write an essay in which you describe how Churchland's neurocomputational analysis speaks to the issues of the theory-ladenness of observation, Kuhn's notion of a paradigm, the issue of explanatory unity, and the hope for a convergent realism.

5. Write an essay in which you describe how Neisser argues that without perception, there is no knowledge. What are the implications of his analysis for AI?

6. Write an essay in which you describe how Brian C. Smith challenges the “CYC” project of Lenat and Feigenbaum from the perspective of his own theory of “embedded computation.”

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Dr. Robert G. Burton**

**Spring Semester 2005
3:30P-4:45P TR Peabody 205S
March 1, 2005**

First Exam

Your instructions are to write an essay on either topic 1 or topic 2, but not both, write an essay on either topic 3 or topic 4, but not both, and write an essay on either topic 5 or topic 6, but not both, for a total of three essays (33 1/3 points each).

1. Write an essay on the problem of privileged access. How and how successfully did behaviorists and type identity theorists deal with the problem? Why have consciousness studies become fashionable only relatively recently? Be specific and defend your claims.
2. Write an essay on the relation between reduction and elimination in the attack on “folk psychology.” Is folk psychology here to stay? If so, why; if not, why not? Be specific and defend your claims.
3. Write an essay on Owen Flanagan’s “natural method” for studying consciousness. What is an example of its application? What are its strengths and weaknesses?
4. Write an essay in which you describe how Churchland's neurocomputational analysis speaks to the issues of the theory-ladenness of observation, Kuhn's notion of a paradigm, the issue of explanatory unity, and the hope for a convergent realism.
5. Write an essay in which you describe how Neisser argues that without perception, there is no knowledge. What are the implications of his analysis for AI?
6. Write an essay in which you describe how Brian C. Smith challenges the “CYC” project of Lenat and Feigenbaum from the perspective of his own theory of “embedded computation.”

Bernard Baars: Contrastive Phenomenology

Contrasts between Conscious and Unconscious Processes

A. Perception

- B. Attention**
- C. Mental Imagery**
- D. Memory and Learning**
- E. Spontaneous Problem-Solving**

Martha Farah: Visual perception and Awareness after Brain Damage

Four Neuropsychological Syndromes: Dissociation between Vision and Awareness of Vision

- A. Blindsight**
- B. Prosopagnosia**
- C. Neglected or Extinguished Stimuli**
- D. Implicit Reading in Pure Alexica**
- E. Three Broad Types of Accounts**
 - 1. Privileged Role of Particular Brain Systems**
 - 2. State of Integration among distinct Brain Systems**
 - 3. Graded Property of Neural Information Processing**

Crick and Koch: Neurobiological Theory of Consciousness

- A. Thesis: Problem of Consciousness solved at Neural Level**
- B. Consciousness depends on short-term memory and serial attentional mechanism: relevant neurons firing in semi-**

oscillatory way 40-70 Hz range imposing temporary global unity in many different parts of the brain

C. Prolegomenon: Two assumptions

- 1. Something requires scientific explanation**
- 2. Different aspects of C employ a common mechanism**

D. Topics to be recognized but left to one side for now:

- 1. What is Consciousness?**
- 2. What is Consciousness for?**
- 3. Some lower animals possess some features of C**
- 4. Language system is not essential**
- 5. C correlates with complexity of nervous System**
- 6. Self-consciousness merely a special case of C**
- 7. No neural theory will explain everything about C**
- 8. The problem of qualia**

E. The cognitive approach: Gofai vs PDP

F. When and Where is an animal conscious?

G. C & K's basic hypothesis

H. Visual Awareness: Binding and Selective V Attention

I. Short Term Memory: Iconic vs Working Memory

J. Neuronal Oscillations

K. Three experimental approaches

L. Summary conclusion: C & K's research program

Flanagan: "Conscious Inessentialism and the Epiphenomenalist Suspicion"

1. What is conscious inessentialism, and how does F attempt to refute it? Is he successful?

2. What is the epiphenomenalist suspicion, and what form of epiphenomenalism might be compatible with the falsehood of conscious inessentialism? (The public-relations

officer or the nosey housekeeper analogies)

3. What are William James' arguments against epiphenomenalism, and why are they now viewed with skepticism?
4. How does the distinction between informational sensitivity and experiential sensitivity (pp.55-6) help show how easy it is to overstate the role of consciousness in mental life (e.g. The case of pain)?
5. What are F's arguments from design that challenge epiphenomenalism? (From its frequent appearance in different species, from its involvement with many distinct mental systems within one species, from certain phenomenological features of consciousness and the neural structures subserving them)?
6. What was Benjamin Libet's experiment (1985) and its findings? How does this relate to the issue of epiphenomenalism according to F? What is F's interpretation of the findings, and do you agree?
7. What is teleological functionalism, and what evidence from both normal individuals and individuals with certain defects of consciousness tends to support it? What results relevant to the function of consciousness come from persons with brain damage: e.g.. blindsight, memory deficits, identity disorders (Zazetsky)?
8. What is Ned Block's argument against the teleofunctionalist's refutation of epiphenomenalism? What is F's reply to Block's argument? Why does F reject the sharp distinction between access and phenomenal consciousness? Which view seems more plausible to you and why?
9. Can the epiphenomenalist explain everything that the teleological functionalist can explain?

Robert Van Gulick: "The Absent Qualia Argument"

1. Phenomenal Experience is not merely the succession of qualitatively distinguished sense data but rather the organized cognitive experience of a world of objects and of ourselves as subjects within that world. Focus on qualia as raw feels is too narrow, and raw feels cannot be understood in isolation from their roles in the richer structure of phenomenal experience (p. 559).

2. The absent qualia argument is question begging (p. 435).
3. The functional role of phenomenal states - A first attempt
 - a. Loss of function resulting from loss of a capacity for phenomenal experience
 1. eg. blind sight or 2. amnesia
 - b. Less pathological cases
 3. learning nonhabitual tasks or 4. inability to form plans of action
4. Why does meta-cognition require phenomenal awareness?
 - a. too little - it seems that higher-order cognition need not require phen. exp.
 - b. too much - It is doubtful that such meta-cog. processes are present in all infrahuman species believed to have some phenomenal consciousness.
5. The functional role of phenomenal states - A second more speculative attempt
6. Two Steps - (p. 437d) and *semantic transparency* - Significant seeing is seeing as.
7. Two last why questions:
 - a. Why do phenomenal representations involve semantic transparency?
Subject and object are interdependent correlatives within experience. Phen representations are *of a world* densely and interdependently related to other objects. Qualia are properties by which regions are differentiated and by which objects as particulars are delimited.
 - b. Why do we humans use representations with phen properties to construct our self-model? Three suggestions: Phen consciousness probably predates meta-cog. self-models. The conscious self is implicit in conscious experience (Kant). The Kantian intuition of a sensuous manifold and the intuition of continuous time are prerequisites for the construction of a unified self.
8. Conclusion: Future theorizing and empirical evidence may banish absent qualia.
Thomas Nagel: "What is it Like to be a Bat?"

1. "...the fact that an organism has conscious experience *at all* means, basically, that there is something it is like to *be* that organism." (P. 519)
2. "If physicalism is to be defended, the phenomenological features must be given a physical account. But when we examine their subjective character it seems that such a result is impossible. The reason is that every subjective phenomenon is essentially

connected with a single point of view, and it seems inevitable that an objective, physical theory will abandon that point of view.” (p. 520)

3. “The problem exists between one person and another. The subjective character of the experience of a person deaf and blind from birth is not accessible to me, for example, nor presumably is mine to him.” (p. 521)

4. What is the relation between facts and conceptual schemes or systems of representation? Nagel’s realism about the subjective domain means that “...there are facts which humans never will possess the requisite concepts to represent.” (p. 522)
This is not just the privacy problem; it is about *types*. What about men and women?

5. What is the general problem about psychophysical reduction? (p. 523)

6. We may have evidence for the truth of something we cannot understand. (p. 524-5)

7. A Speculative proposal - develop a new objective phenomenology not dependent on empathy or the imagination. For example, one might try to develop concepts that would enable one to explain to a person blind from birth what it is like to see.

Robert Van Gulick: “Phenomenal knowledge and Explanatory Gaps”

1. Phenomenal Experience is not merely the succession of qualitatively distinguished sense data but rather the organized cognitive experience of a world of objects and of ourselves as subjects within that world. Focus on qualia as raw feels is too narrow, and raw feels cannot be understood in isolation from their roles in the richer structure of phenomenal experience (p. 559).

2. Frank Jackson's knowledge argument
3. Figure 35.1
4. Joseph Levine's "explanatory gap argument": not an argument but an intuition that the physical cannot explain the phenomenological.
5. Colin McGinn's version of the argument: We may be armadillos vis a vis understanding the relation between brain and phenomenal experience.
6. The inverted spectrum argument and a finer grained analysis of both phenomenal color space and neural realization: two points (pp. 564-5).
7. The challenge of Multiple realizability: Token identity or domain specific type identity - leftover residue shrinking toward zero.
8. Conclusion

Frank Jackson: What Mary Didn't Know

1. Three clarifications: a. powers of imagination are not to the point, b. the intentionality of knowledge is not to the point, c. the K at issue is K about the experiences of others.
2. Churchland's three objections:
 - a. the charge of equivocation and the reconstructed argument

- b. the charge that the argument proves too much
- c. the charge that Mary could not *imagine* what the relevant experience was like

Paul Churchland: Knowing Qualia: A Reply to Jackson

1. The Persistent Equivocation
2. A plausible cognitive neurobiological account of the difference between knowing how and knowing that.
3. A parallel refutation by logical analogy of *substance dualism*
4. A genuinely nonequivocal knowledge argument - begging the question
5. Converting a 3rd person account into a 1st person account
6. Does Churchland's analogy go through?

David Armstrong: What is Consciousness?

A. Minimal Consciousness vs Total Unconsciousness

B. Perceptual Consciousness

C. Introspective Consciousness

Implicit vs Explicit (Focal vs Subsidiary Awareness)

D. What is so special about Introspective Consciousness?

William Lycan: Consciousness as Internal Monitoring

A. The Hegemony of Representation

B. Four advantages of the Inner Sense View

C. Two Problems: 1. Misreporting & 2. False Positive

D. Dretske's criticisms

E. Rosenthal's criticism

F. Dennett's criticism

G. Hill's criticism

H. Rey's criticism

I. Concluding Argument

Fred Dretske: Conscious Experience

A. Perceptual Experience of X vs Perceptual Belief About X
a concept-free mental state vs a concept-charged mental state

B. Four Theses about Consciousness

C. Armstrong's long-distance truck driver case

D. Conscious States without Fact-awareness
Conscious States without Thing-awareness

E. What Makes Experiences Conscious?

1. Not HOT
2. Not “Inner Sense”
3. D’s Answer: The Role It plays in making one intransitively conscious. One is conscious *with* them.

Guzelderer: Consciousness as Higher-Order Representing (HOR)

Perception-Like (HOP)

Armstrong, Churchland, & Lycan

vs

Thought-Like (HOT)

Rosenthal & Dennett

HOPs face a Trilemma: they are either a. forced to abandon their two tiered structure, or b. forced to commit themselves to the fallacy of the representational divide, or c. turn into a species of HOT theory.

Individual Consciousness

vs

State Consciousness

For HOR theories, a mental state M of subject S is *state-conscious* if and only if S is *individual conscious* of M. (ILP)

Three Possible Objects of Perception in HOP Theories:

1. The content of one's mental state "passing through" (the cup),
2. The mental state itself, or
3. The thought that one has a mental state with its content (cup)

1. Is not an option since it collapses the two levels into one.

2. Two interpretations: a. direct inspection of one's brain states vs b. seeing with the Mind's Eye - a resemblance theory of mental representations.

These options are all just so stories that do not account for the HOP hypothesis. They all commit the fallacy of the representational divide by conflating the properties of that which is represented, the content (eg., the cup) with the intrinsic properties of the mental states, the vehicles that represent for us the world around as well as in, us. But since the 1st horn of the Trilemma is not an option, the HOP theorist is forced to the third horn and is transformed into a HOT theorist.

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Spring Semester 2005
3:30P-4:45P TR Peabody 205S
April 26, 2005

Second Exam

Choose any three of the following essay topics and write all three essays. (33 1/3 pts. each).

1. Write an essay on the claim that neuropsychological research on phenomena such as blindsight and prosopagnosia shows that epiphenomenalism is false. Does it? If so, how; if not, why not?
2. Sketch and evaluate Robert Van Gulick's critique of the *Absent Qualia Argument*. Be specific and defend your claims.
3. Sketch and evaluate the debate concerning the *Knowledge Argument* between Frank Jackson and Paul Churchland. Which has the stronger arguments and why? Be specific and defend your claims.
4. Sketch the *HOP Theory* of either David Armstrong or William Lycan. Then sketch and evaluate Güven Güzeldere's critique of the theory. Be specific and defend your claims.
5. Sketch and evaluate Fred Dretske's account of conscious experience. Be specific and defend your claims.