I am a philosopher of mind with a strong background
in Continental philosophy in general and phenomenology
in particular. So although my research primarily
concerns issues current in the contemporary Anglo-American
analytic tradition, my treatment of these issues typically
reflects Continental perspectives. Similarly,
the slate of courses I normally teach includes some
with exclusively Anglo-American content (e.g., Philosophy
of Mind, Theory of Knowledge, and recent graduate seminars
covering the work of Michael Bratman, Alvin Goldman
and Helen Longino); and some with exclusively Continental
content (e.g., Existentialism, Contemporary Continental
Tradition, and graduate seminars on the work of Michel
Foucault and Friedrich Nietzsche). In addition,
I regularly teach courses with content bridging these
two traditions (e.g., Technology and Values), and in
the history of philosophy (e.g., 19th Century Western
Philosophy).
My dissertation and early research concerned the philosophical
foundations of artificial intelligence, particularly
the critiques of AI advanced by thinkers such as J.
R. Lucas, Joseph Weizenbaum, John Searle and Hubert
Dreyfus. The most interesting of these, in my
view, is the Heidegger inspired work of Dreyfus and
John Haugeland, which I interpreted as calling into
question the representational theory of intentionality
assumed in AI. In my dissertation and subsequent
publications I tried to extend their work in the direction
of a non-representational theory of intentionality,
drawing not only on Husserl and Heidegger, but on some
then new developments in AI, particularly the robotics
work of Rodney Brooks and his students.
My current research grew out of this interest in robotics. Ultimately,
robots must be able to negotiate the cultural world
of artifacts and built environments. This means
dealing not only with the natural features of things,
but with their functional features; and it requires
participation in the socially mediated activities involved
in the production and use of material culture. But
how do we do this? There is virtually
no philosophical literature dealing with any aspect
of this question. Function theory in philosophy
is tailored to questions about biological function;
and action theory has historically focused on questions
about the nature of intentions and individual intentional
action, with no particular reference to material culture. My
current research is aimed at filling in these lacunae in
function theory and action theory.
The function theory strand of this research started
with the question of whether and to what extent philosophical
theories of biological function apply to artifact function. The
quick answer, frequently encountered, is that function
in material culture is completely unlike biological
function in that it depends on the intentions and beliefs
of intelligent agents. But my research so far
indicates that this answer is much too quick, since
the functions of artifacts do not depend in any straightforward
way on the intentional states of individual agents,
or even identifiable groups of agents (design teams,
for instance). Further complicating this story
is a phenomenologically salient difference in material
culture between the proper functions of artifacts—the
purposes they are supposed to fulfill in virtue
of design, longstanding custom, etc.—and what
I call their system functions—the other purposes
they are called on to fulfill by their users. For
example, a tableknife may be used to put in screws,
transplant seedlings, loosen the skin of garlic cloves,
and so on. These functions clearly depend as much
on the physical structure of the artifacts as on any
intentions and beliefs of the agents involved. And
this in turn points back to general questions about
structure and function in material culture, such as
how the reproduction and variation of structures is
related to the reproduction and variation of proper
functions.
The action theory strand of my research started with
the question of whether and to what extent philosophical
action theory provides an adequate foundation for a
philosophical account of material culture. Two
problems surfaced right away. First, action theory
has recently appropriated the planning model of action
common in AI and cognitive science as the basis for
understanding intentions and intentional action. But
the activity involved in both the production and the
use of material culture is typically improvisatory,
and is not captured by the planning model. So
one major component of my research is a theory of improvisation. I
believe that a similar difficulty may exist with regard
to habit; and I hope to make a theory of habitual action
the topic of a future project. The second problem
is that action theory has historically focused on individual
action, and has only very recently begun to consider
action involving multiple agents. But the activity
involved in the production and use of material culture
is not only typically collaborative, but is thoroughly
social—that is, it depends on supra-individual
practices of a culturally and historically local sort. So
a second major component of my research in this area
is to integrate an account of collaboration and sociality
into my theory of improvisation.
Selected publications
Of Marigold Beer – A Reply to Vermaas and Houkes. The
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54 (2003):
601-612.
The Functions of Things: A Philosophical Perspective
on Material Culture. In Matter, Materiality
and Modern Culture, Paul Graves-Brown, ed.,
Routledge, 2000: 22-49.
Cognition and Tool Use. Mind & Language 13 (4),
December 1998: 513-547.
Why is a Wing Like a Spoon? A Pluralist Theory
of Function. The Journal of Philosophy 95 (5),
May 1998:215-254.
The Ontological Argument Against the Mind-Machine Hypothesis. Philosophical
Studies 80 (2), November 1995: 131-157.
Behaviorism
and Mentalism: Is There a Third Alternative? Synthese 100 (2),
August 1994: 167-196.
Heidegger and Artificial Intelligence. Philosophy
and Phenomenological Research 53 (1),
March 1993: 43-69.
