Recent work in the ethics of belief pays increasing attention to cases in which it seems morally objectionable to form beliefs about others on the basis of demographic or statistical evidence, even if one does not act on those beliefs. Such cases raise the specter of conflict between the moral status of a belief and its epistemic justification. Defenders of moral encroachment argue that such conflicts can be avoided only by rejecting epistemic purism and positing that moral considerations affect epistemic justification. This paper develops an alternative approach inspired by Simone de Beauvoir’s existentialist ethics. For Beauvoir, human existence is defined by ambiguity. We exist both as facticity, situated within social conditions beyond our control, and as freedom, capable of transcending what is given to us. Beauvoir maintains that others’ freedom is disclosed to us through interpersonal experience, which gives us robust, noninferential access to it. To form beliefs about others solely on the basis of demographic or statistical evidence is to ignore this freedom and treat them as pure facticity. Crucially, this means that ignoring the freedom of others is at once both an epistemic and a moral mistake. Thus, if we accept the Beauvoirian picture, it is unnecessary to posit moral encroachment on epistemic justification to explain the moral data. Moreover, this existentialist alternative to encroachment delivers a deeper integration between the epistemic and the moral that is wholly compatible with purism.